The aim of this paper is to provide deeper insights into the impact of regulatory reforms and privatization on the R&D spending of electricity utilities. Building on a novel panel data set including the biggest European utilities from eight EU countries over a period from 1985 to 2010, we find that the overall influence of the European regulatory reform process on R&D investment is ambiguous. The empirical evidence indicates that the approaching liberalization process, i.e., nearing competition, has a dampening effect on R&D spending. Utilities reduce their expenses due to increased uncertainties and additional risks. However, once the market and regulatory framework conditions have been set up and firms have become used to the new situation, higher levels of competition positively influence R&D and former incumbents invest more in order to "escape" from the competition. Moreover, we find no indication that (ownership) unbundling and incentive regulation directly affect the research expenditures of the utilities. In contrast, the privatization of utilities seems to have strong negative consequences for their amount of R&D spending.
rules for the internal electricity market, which entered into force in February 1997, forced EU member states to start liberalizing their electricity industries and to open up their markets for competition gradually. Third-party access to the electricity grid became mandatory and accounting unbundling of the transmission grid and other stages of the sector had to be implemented. The second directive, 2003/54/EC, and the third directive, 2009/72/EC, should further spur the achievement of a harmonized and liberalized EU-wide electricity market. During that period, regulation altered and adapted to these changes; additionally, privatization of the formerly state-owned utilities took place all across Europe. Contrary to the EU directives, which were enacted on the European level, privatization was only a question of national governments and parliaments. Although the direction of all these reforms was more or less predetermined, there were differences in the speed of the reforms' implementation between member states; in terms of the degree of public ownership, there are still big differences between countries today.
Initially, politicians and regulators concentrated on building up a functioning regulatory regime. Their primary focus was on static (allocative) efficiency, i.e., prices close to marginal costs. This should be achieved through the introduction of market mechanisms, regulated grid tariffs, and efficiency gains, which should ultimately lead to lower costs and prices and thereby to a higher level of social welfare. However, due to the lack of incentives for cost-efficient operations, most European countries have switched from pure cost-based regulation to more incentive-based forms of regulation, such as price or revenue caps or yardstick regulation. Under these regulatory regimes, doubts have arisen regarding whether they pay enough attention to investment incentives and thereby to dynamic efficiency (Brunekreeft and Bauknecht 2009) . Only a few studies deal with the effects on capital investment (Von Hirschhausen et al. 2004; Alesina et al. 2005; Newbery 2005; Gugler et al. 2013 ) and even less attention has been given to innovation and research and development (R&D) investment (Munari 2003; Jamasb and Pollitt 2008) . A very topical exception is the work of Kim et al. (2012) , who investigate the R&D expenditures of electricity-generating firms in OECD countries. 1 All across Europe, the major electricity companies have drastically reduced their R&D expenditures since the late 1990s, as shown for example by Sterlacchini for the sharply reduced R&D investments of European utilities. Therefore, we disentangle the different dimensions of the European regulatory reform process, which has not been undertaken in previous studies at this level of detail, as far as we know. Thus, we distinguish the degree of unbundling of the power lines, the regulatory regime (cost-based vs. incentive-based regulation), the establishment of a liberalized wholesale market, the degree of third-party access to the grid and the degree of privatization. We make use of a novel panel data set including the main utilities in eight European countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) over the period from 1985 until 2010. This paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 provides background information on R&D in the electricity sector. Section 3 presents our main hypotheses and the corresponding literature. Section 4 describes the data set; Section 5 illustrates our econometric model specification, the main results, and the robustness checks. The last section concludes.
R&D in the Electricity Industry
R&D is essential for the innovative process in an economy and, unquestionably, it is an important driver of economic growth. Thereby, it plays an important role as a determinant of economic welfare (Bond and van Reenen 2007) . Typically, R&D projects can be described as long-term, risky, unpredictable, multi-stage, labor-intensive, and idiosyncratic (i.e. not easily comparable with other projects) (Holmstrom 1989 ). There are different economic characteristics that distinguish the R&D investment of a firm from other kinds of investment. First, the uncertainties arising from R&D activities are relatively high, since R&D outcomes are more difficult to predict and evaluate in comparison with other outcomes of a firm. Second, incomplete property rights play an important role (Cohen and Sanyal 2004) . Successful R&D in the energy sector -which frequently leads to the occurrence of public goods -produces knowledge that is not easy to protect fully. This kind of market failure cannot be completely solved through patent systems, which are accompanied by additional problems. Therefore, free riding can be a serious issue in this context, ultimately leading to lower levels of R&D investment than would be socially optimal. Third, the indivisibility of R&D projects can hamper investment, in particular for research, which addresses the interaction between different stages of an industry that are not part of a single vertically integrated company. This is especially true for the electricity sector with its four different stages: generation, transmission, distribution, and retail (Defeuilley and Furtado 2000) . Still, most R&D in the electricity sector is performed at the generation stage, but R&D in transmission, distribution, and especially in the overlap between the different stages is becoming more important. The reasons are, for instance, the increasing importance of smart grids, e-mobility, decentralized generation, and demand-side management programs.
The influence of the government on the electricity sector is still high in comparison with other industries. Although privatization has gradually reduced the direct state influence on most European utilities, politicians have achieved more indirect influence through regulation. Therefore, firm behavior in the electricity sector often has to be seen in the light of government decisions, which sometimes are not easy to anticipate. Firms always have to fear political and regulatory reforms, which increase uncertainty and can be costly, especially in the case of long-term decisions (Joskow 2002) . 4 As R&D projects are rather long-term orientated, they are particularly sensitive to political and regulatory changes.
Literature and Hypotheses
This section examines the literature on the regulatory and ownership determinants of R&D investment, adopting an industrial organization perspective. Our main focus is directed towards the impact of regulation and the introduction of market forces, such as competition and privatization, on electric utilities' R&D spending. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence, we derive our hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Due to contradictory explanations and conflicting views in the literature it is not possible to formulate clear hypotheses for all regulatory measures. Since the literature on this topic is very limited, in particular for Europe, we extend our focus to other countries (primarily the US) if it seems reasonable. However, the institutional and regulatory frameworks in Europe and in the US differ in many respects, necessitating more European research on this topic.
Regulatory Reform Determinants of R&D Investment
One might differentiate between the overall impact of regulation on R&D investment and the impact of specific regulatory measures on R&D investment. The former subsumes all the regulatory actions taken by governments and regulators and, thereby, helps to provide a general and overall impression about the effect of regulation on utilities' R&D expenditures. Unquestionably, the whole liberalization process in the European electricity sector has changed the market processes and regulatory framework conditions from scratch. This has also affected the R&D spending of utilities, which has come under the general pressure of cost reductions and which -not least because of the public goods characteristicshas suffered in particular under rising uncertainty and the fear of competitive pressure (Dooley 1998) . This holds primarily for particularly expensive long-term R&D projects that are not directed to cost-reducing process innovation. Building on these considerations, the following hypothesis can be derived:
The overall impact of the European regulatory reform process on utilities' R&D spending is negative.
The empirical evidence from the US supports this hypothesis. Analyzing US utilities' expenditures on environmental research during 1990 and 2001 , Sanyal (2007 finds that the regulatory reforms 5 -which started in the year 1996 -led to a 40% drop in firms' R&D spending. Similar results are obtained by Sanyal and Cohen (2009) regarding US utilities' R&D expenditures.
As mentioned before, the overall impact of regulation on R&D investment measures the gross effect of regulation, incorporating all the regulatory measures altogether. However, the underlying coherences are certainly more complex. In order to gain deeper insights into the subject, we decompose the overall regulation into specific individual measures of regulation, which may have opposing effects on R&D investment. Consequently, we deal with the subcategories vertical integration vs. unbundling, incentive regulation vs. cost-based regulation, and market entry regulation of the power lines.
Vertical Integration vs. Unbundling
Since the mid-1990s, the degree of vertical integration has decreased continuously across European utilities, as required by different EU directives. As the first step, functional and accounting unbundling of the transmission grid was implemented, followed by the requirement of legal unbundling. With the third legislative package on European energy markets in September 2007, the European Commission required even stronger forms of unbundling, such as ownership unbundling, a deep independent system operator (ISO), or an independent transmission operator (ITO). 6 In recent years, the focus of politicians and regulators regarding unbundling has extended from the transmission grid to the distribution lines, although the level of unbundling of the distribution lines today is far behind the level of the transmission grid. The theoretical and empirical evidence on the consequences of unbundling are ambiguous. The possible positive effects of stronger forms of unbundling, like increased competition and less discrimination potential against entrants, should be compared with the possible negative effects, like the loss of coordination advantages or the loss of vertical synergies between different stages of the sector.
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A number of arguments point in the direction that unbundling -and especially ownership unbundling as its strongest form -leads to lower levels of R&D spending of the utilities, at least in the short run (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008; Brunekreeft and Bauknecht 2009) . First, bigger firms normally perform more R&D, as the risks of R&D projects become relatively smaller with increasing firm size. Since ownership unbundling of former vertically integrated utilities reduces the firm size significantly, one can expect that the divestment of the grid assets reduces the joint R&D spending of the old generation company and the newly created grid company. This argument also holds for less strong forms of unbundling, such as legal unbundling, but very likely to a lower extent. In addition, risk diversification of R&D projects is only possible for an integrated firm with its different stages, but not for a single generation or grid company. The empirical evidence confirms that the R&D spending of utilities increases with firm size (Wilder and Stansell 1974; Delaney and Honeycutt 1976) .
Second, the problem of free riding can have a dampening effect on R&D investment. If there is only one vertically integrated utility in a country, clearly all the innovations come from this firm. However, in a market with more firms (as a result of restructuring and unbundling), the utilities might have greater incentives to benefit from the innovative outcomes of the others, leading to a reduction in their R&D budget. Third, if coordination advantages of vertical integration exist in the electricity sector, they should be present in the R&D activities of the utilities (Jamasb amd Pollitt 2008) . (Ownership) unbundling would reduce or destroy these coordination advantages, which would also 6 Ownership unbundling is the strongest and most dominant form of unbundling in Europe. It requires the ownership and control of the transmission grid to be fully separated from the generation and distribution. For a detailed description of the less stringent ISO and ITO options, we refer to Balmert and Brunekreeft (2010) . 7 As this discussion is not the main focus of this work, we refer inter alia to Arocena et al. (2009) , Gugler et al. (2013) , Keller and Wild (2004) , Kwoka (2002) , and Pollitt (2008) for deeper insights.
have consequences for the research projects. Moreover, unbundling can change the type of R&D projects. Integrated firms are not solely but also interested in research projects that concern the interrelation between the different stages of the industry, as they can benefit in every single stage, in contrast to a single generation or grid company.
On the other hand, utilities that have been forced to (ownership) unbundle the grid stage can now fully concentrate on the generation business, thereby exploiting specialization advantages. In order to maintain or even extend their profits from generation, they might invest more in R&D. Obviously, the same explanation may also apply to a separated grid company. Furthermore, effective forms of unbundling could reduce the discrimination potential against nonincumbent firms, thereby stimulating competition. This is due to the fact that the newly created grid operator has an incentive to spur competition upstream (i.e. generation) and downstream (i.e. retail) and treat all firms equally (which is not necessarily true for a vertically integrated firm).
In summary, the literature provides arguments for a possible negative effect of unbundling on R&D expenditures, such as reduced firm size, free-riding incentives, and the loss of coordination advantages. At the same time, however, there are contradictory arguments, such as specialization advantages and reduced discrimination potential. A priori it is not clear which effects dominate, making it impossible to formulate a clear hypothesis. Hence, empirical evidence should give the answer to how (ownership) unbundling of the grid stage affects the amount of utilities' R&D expenditures.
Incentive Regulation vs. Cost-Based Regulation of the Power Lines
During the past 15 years, almost all the countries of the EU have switched from cost-based forms of network regulation to incentive-based forms of regulation, such as price caps, revenue caps, or yardstick competition. The main reason for this change is that under cost-based regulation there were too few incentives for the utilities to operate cost-efficiently and to transfer possible efficiency savings to the final consumers via lower prices. Typically, firms could pass on all their costs, once they were approved by the regulator, 8 whereas the incentives to achieve cost-efficient realization of research projects were rather weak. Under 8 It could be the case that utilities under cost-plus regulation invest too much in R&D (the "goldplating" effect). However, this argument does not hold for today's situation, as the current challenges for power lines are much bigger than ever before, for example due to smart grids, decentralized generation, and reverse power flows. incentive regulation, utilities are required to obtain efficiency savings each year, which are passed on to consumers. This mechanism changes the incentives of the firms, as expenditures on risky long-term projects such as R&D could easily be cut in order to increase the short-term cost-efficiency. This possible decline in R&D spending is in line with the firms' incentives to conduct the remaining projects more cost-efficiently (relieving their R&D budget). Furthermore, incentive regulation impedes stranded cost recovery and raises regulatory and market uncertainty, ultimately delaying and hampering investment (Dobbs 2004; Evans and Guthrie 2005) . Finally, it is very likely that incentive regulation changes the structure of R&D projects, as the main focus will lie more on short-term projects than on basic and long-term activities.
The relevant empirical literature is primarily orientated towards rate-ofreturn regulation and the situation in the US. Nelson (1984) , examining US utilities between 1951 and 1978, points out that if policy makers want to accelerate certain generation technologies, thereby increasing the specific R&D activities of firms, they should rely on policy instruments that privilege the preferred technologies rather than on changes in the allowed rate of return. Mayo and Flynn (1988) analyze the effect of rate-of-return regulation on utilities' R&D expenditures in the US for the years 1975 and 1983. Regulation is captured by two variables, namely the allowed rate of return and a dummy for R&D investment allowed in the rate base. Their findings show that both variables are important determinants of R&D spending.
According to the theoretical literature, the introduction of incentive regulation should have a negative effect on R&D investment due to rising regulatory and market uncertainty, as a result of the impediment of stranded cost recovery and the incentives of the utilities to perform research projects more cost-efficiently, relieving the R&D budget. However, in the real world, incentive regulation regimes include cost-based components (for instance full or partial cost pass-through for R&D expenditures). In addition, utilities' R&D investment in power lines -the regulated part -is still relatively small in comparison with their investment in generation, so that changes in power line investment could be outperformed by changes in generation investment. Finally, it is an empirical question whether the introduction of incentive regulation has a measurable impact on the R&D investment of the utilities.
Market Entry Regulation
The main purpose of access regulation is to reduce the market entry barriers, to help entrants to enter the market, and, finally, to increase the level of effective competition.
9 In other words, entry regulation is strictly required for achieving competition in an industry that is characterized by natural monopoly characteristics. Policy makers and regulators can choose between different instruments of entry regulation. Since these instruments can differ substantially from each other, it is possible that they affect firms in different ways.
The first entry variable accounts for the existence of a liberalized wholesale market. Prior to liberalization, almost all the electricity in Europe was generated by big vertically integrated utilities, which usually retained their specific individual generation technologies over time. Especially since the last decade, new-generation technologies have emerged, such as renewables, which are particularly interesting for entrants as they have to start their business from scratch, in contrast to incumbents, who can still rely on their "old"-generation power plants and technologies. Through the existence of a wholesale market, entrants are now able to sell their electricity to third parties much more easily. This attracts new investment in these technologies not only from the entrants but also from the incumbents, who do not want to lose their leading position at the technological front. In addition, there are policies in some European countries that favor "green" generation sources over traditional generation technologies. All in all, the existence of a wholesale market has helped to open up the electricity market for new innovations and technologies. Liberalized wholesale markets do not necessarily only attract more investment for renewables. This might also be true for conventional technologies, as the incumbents can have the intention to "escape" the competition, while the entrants have to make large investments in order to catch up. Consequently, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The existence of a liberalized wholesale market leads to higher levels of R&D expenditures.
The second variable is third-party access to the transmission grid. Stepwise simplification of third-party access should ensure that new generators are connected to the market such that they have access to the natural monopoly. Traditionally, this measure has been among the first ones to be implemented in EU member states according to Directive 1996/92/EC. Hence, a wholesale market could only be built up in a country once third-party access to the transmission grid had been made possible (at least for the countries we consider here). Policy makers did not expect that the first step towards third-party access would directly introduce com-petition into the market. Rather, free access to the market has been a precondition for the occurrence of competition, as other regulatory measures, such as effective forms of unbundling for example, had to be implemented first. Ultimately, thirdparty access is strongly linked to the concept of nearing competition; the underlying joint hypothesis is presented in the following section.
Competition as a Determinant of R&D Investment
With regard to competition in a formerly monopolistic industry, one can distinguish between nearing competition and the actual level of competition (see Sanyal and Cohen 2009) . Nearing competition describes a situation in which the monopolist starts to fear future competition due to a unique event. The liberalization process in the European electricity sector, which enabled entrants to enter the market for the first time, is a good example. Anticipating the liberalization of the sector, the incumbent utility expects radically modified framework conditions with serious consequences for the market structure. In other words, the incumbent is afraid of losing the monopoly profits, in particular the best monopoly profit of a quite life. The fear of entering this situation, not well prepared for competitors, raises the uncertainty of the incumbent significantly, as the overall risks increase. Sustained additional risk increases the cost of capital, which can have at least two consequences according to Blyth et al. (2011) . First, investment can be delayed until the uncertainty has been at least partially resolved. Second, the additional risk increases the pay-offs required from the project in order to justify proceeding with the project rather than waiting. In any case, higher levels of uncertainty and risks linked to the approaching end of the quite life as a monopolist affect profit expectations negatively, which could be counteracted by operating more cost-efficiently. One likely and easy way to deal with this situation is to reduce R&D investment (and in particular those kinds of R&D investment that are not directly linked to cost-efficiency-increasing process innovation). Accordingly, the underlying hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Nearing competition (measured as the remaining years until the implementation of (free) third-party access to the transmission grid) has a negative impact on R&D investment.
The fear of nearing competition, caused by an event such as liberalization, does not necessarily say much about the future level of competition on a market. The subsequent question is whether the actual competitive pressure among firms (including the incumbent and entrants) leads to more or less investment in R&D. That there is no clear and easy answer to this question is shown not least by Aghion et al. (2005) , who describe the relation between competition and innovation as inverted U-shaped. Nevertheless, one can distinguish at least two conflicting lines of reasoning, which have particular relevance for the electricity industry. On the one hand, higher levels of competition can increase R&D spending either because of the incumbent or because of the entrants. With regard to the former, more competition can increase the incentive of the incumbent to innovate and hence to spend more on R&D in order to "escape competition" (Arrow 1962; Aghion et al. 2005 ). However, this race for patents -implying more R&D effortscan also be initiated by the entrant, which has to start from scratch, whereas the incumbent mainly has to replace itself and its older profits when innovating (the "replacement effect") (Arrow 1962; Gilbert and Newbery 1982) . As the importance of entrants to the European electricity sector has been rather limited in recent years, we expect that this line of reasoning would primarily hold for the incumbents.
On the other hand, more intense competition can have a depressing effect on firms' R&D spending. According to Motta (2004) and others, an increase in competition makes it more difficult for a firm to benefit exclusively from its innovations. In other words, more competition can increase the free riding of competitors, finally reducing the appropriability of a firm to profit from its own inventions. This ultimately lowers the incentives of the underlying firm to innovate and spend more resources on R&D.
Empirical evidence regarding this controversial issue is scarce, in particular for the European energy market. Defeuilley and Furtado (2000) compare electricity reforms in the US and the UK (England and Wales). According to the authors, the introduction of competition has led to a lower level of firm R&D investment, but the nature of investment has changed, as R&D efforts are now more focused on short-term objectives and concrete applications. The incentives to undertake risky long-term research, in particular the kind of research that focuses on the interaction between generation, transmission, and distribution, have dropped remarkably. Sanyal and Cohen (2009) analyze the impact of restructuring in the US electricity sector over the period from 1990 to 2000 and reach the conclusion that both greater competition and nearing competition affect firm R&D expenditures negatively.
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Both the theoretical and the empirical literature provide contradictory evidence on the causal relation between competition and R&D investment in the 10 The authors find that a 1% increase in customers eligible for retail competition (as a measure of actual competitive pressure) decreases R&D spending by 0.4%, and every month in which retail competition comes closer (as a measure of nearing competition) leads to an overall decline in utilities' R&D investment of 3%. electricity sector. Consequently, it is an empirical question which of the conflicting lines of reasoning better describes the situation in the European electricity industry.
Public Ownership as a Determinant of R&D Investment
Public ownership enables governments to influence the behavior of utilities directly, which may also have implications for firm decisions concerning innovation and R&D. In many European countries, the degree of public ownership in the electricity sector has decreased continuously over the last two decades, although the speed and degree of privatization have varied and still vary widely across countries.
11 Some researchers, e.g., Sterlacchini (2012) , state that there is a causal relation between this drop in public ownership and the decline in R&D investment of utilities, 12 and a number of economic arguments indeed point in this direction.
Privatization is not just a process that affects firms as any other process; it changes the objective functions, incentives, and behavior of a firm from scratch (Munari 2003) . In contrast to private firms, which are assumed to maximize profits, public firms follow a different objective function, as they try to maximize social welfare. However, according to the public choice theory, politicians and managers of state-owned enterprises can rather behave opportunistically or pursue their own personal interests when making decisions on behalf of public enterprises, which sometimes is not welfare optimal and can cause incentive problems (Niskanen 1971; Vickers and Yarrow 1997). As a consequence, efficiency under public ownership may be lower than under private ownership, which is also supported by the property rights theory. Here, it is argued that private firms better mitigate agency problems between the managers and the owners of a firm due to internal control factors, such as a more efficient firm structure, corporate governance, and better monitoring opportunities, but also because of external control factors, such as greater discipline arising from the presence of capital markets and the threat of bankruptcy (Vickers and Yarrow 1997) . The empirical research confirms the greater efficiency of private firms; see Megginson and Netter (2001) for a survey.
11 There are some exceptions to this trend, e.g., the German utility ENBW. 12 One could argue that the previous R&D spending was too high from a social welfare economic perspective. However, certainly, today's requirements for technological progress in the electricity sector -and therefore also for R&D efforts and R&D spending of the utilities -are expected to be higher than 20 years ago. In addition, Helm and Thompson (1991) claim that underinvestment causes higher social costs than overinvestment.
The different incentives and objective functions of state-owned enterprises lead to the situation that the R&D activities of public firms differ from those of private firms. The research projects of public firms are typically more long-term orientated with a stronger focus on broader national goals in order to generate public goods (Munari 2003; Sanyal and Cohen 2009 ). This holds in particular for the electricity sector, in which negative externalities like emissions or other forms of pollution have become a big issue. Furthermore, state-controlled companies perform more basic research that is much riskier, and they also have greater willingness to share the results of their R&D process within the national system. 13 This is not true for private firms, in which property rights and patents play a much bigger role; see Munari (2003) . Privatized firms concentrate more on their core businesses, reduce risky long-term projects, and focus more on applied research, which can be commercialized more easily and in a shorter time period Munari and Sobrero 2003) .
To sum up, due to their objective function as welfare maximizers, public utilities have greater incentives to invest in costly basic and long-term research, which is strongly connected to overall welfare (in particular concerning public goods or the avoidance of negative externalities). In contrast, the underlying market pressure and control mechanisms of private utilities could lead to too strong a focus on short-term goals, thereby not correctly accounting for the long-term decisions of the firms, such as basic R&D. More efficient private firms are also more likely to reduce the overheads and unproductive slack resources within the R&D department. Building on these considerations, the following hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis 4: Utilities with majority state ownership invest relatively more in R&D projects than utilities with majority private ownership. 14 Confirmation of this hypothesis would be in line with most of the empirical evidence available for other industries. Munari et al. (2002) consider one Japanese and three European former monopolists that have been privatized, including the partial privatization of the Italian utility ENEL. For the European firms, the authors find a reduction in R&D expenditures, a decrease in the number of R&D personnel, a shift towards applied and commercial projects, and a higher level 13 It is not very likely that electrical equipment manufacturers will perform more costly basic research with public goods characteristics, thereby replacing privatized utilities' research investments, as the profit expectations from this kind of research are rather low (Sanyal and Cohen 2009 ). 14 It is very likely that the effects mentioned so far also hold for partially privatized firms, but on a proportional basis depending on the degree of privatization; see Munari (2003) . The higher the private share in a firm, the stronger the discontinuity with previous practices and the greater the effect on the innovative activities of the underlying firm. of patent activity per researcher. In a recent paper, Munari et al. (2010) perform a multi-industry analysis of 1000 publicly traded European companies from various industries for the year 1996. They do not find a positive impact of state ownership on R&D intensity. However, cross-sectional data may not be appropriate for analyzing this causal relation, as longitudinal effects are important in this matter.
Sample and Data

Sample
The main data sources are Platts PowerVision, Datastream, OECD, Eurostat, EU documents, and annual reports of the underlying firms. Our data set is an unbalanced panel including 20 European electricity utilities over a period from 1985 until 2010. The utilities are located in eight European countries, which are Austria (EVN, Verbund), the Czech Republic (CEZ), Finland (Fortum), France (EDF, GDF Suez), Germany (E.ON, ENBW, MVV, RWE, Vattenfall Europe), Italy (Enel, Terna), Spain (Endesa, Iberdrola, Red Electrica), and the UK (National Grid, Powergen, Scottish and Southern Energy, Scottish Power). We start with a list of the 200 biggest generators in Europe, obtained from Platts. After dropping the utilities that are not available in Datastream as they are not listed on a stock exchange, excluding the generators that are auto-producers, banks, and those with a main focus that is not on electricity (according to the top two 4-digit SIC codes), we derive a sample size of 20 electrical firms. Although this number seems small, our sample is largely representative of the European electricity sector and of the electricity sector in each country, respectively (similar to Cambini and Rondi 2010) . At the EU level, these firms generate more than 50% of the total electricity generated; at the country level, our sample includes the most important utilities, except Spain (for which Gas Natural is absent due to missing data) and the UK (for which we can only include Powergen, Scottish and Southern Energy, and Scottish Power). Our sample is not only restricted to generators, as we include the TSOs of Italy (Terna), Spain (Red Electrica), and the UK (National Grid). In Austria and France, the TSOs APG and RTE are only legally unbundled (according to the ITO model), and are therefore still owned by their parent companies Verbund and EDF, which belong to our sample. The same is true for the German utilities ENBW and RWE with their corresponding transmission grid area. The remaining transmission grid area in Germany is now operated by two ownership unbundled TSOs (Tennet and Elia), as E.ON and Vattenfall Europe sold them in 2009 and 2010. As our sample period ends in 2010, all four large German utilities can be considered as legally unbundled.
Variables
The dependent variable is R&D expenditures of the utilities, RD. Thereby, we follow other studies using this type of indicator of innovation input, as e.g., Cohen and Sanyal (2004) , Kim et al. (2012) or Sanyal and Cohen (2009) . In the robustness check section we carry out additional regressions using R&D intensity (which is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) as dependent variable.
We employ a set of independent variables. Their detailed explanation and the underlying data sources are reported in Appendix A; descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix B. The main variables of interest are the regulatory and public ownership variables.
Our six regulatory variables are: the starting point of the regulatory reform process, REG, ownership unbundling, OU, overall degree of vertical separation, OVS, incentive regulation, IR, liberalized wholesale market, LWM, and third-party access to the transmission grid, TPA. The regulatory variables are coded in such a way that larger values indicate more stringent regulation. Thus, REG takes the value of 1 once the European regulatory reform process has started in the year 1997 according to the first internal electricity market directive, 1996/92/EC. For the years prior to this event, the dummy variable is equal to 0. In addition two adjustments are made. First, as the reform process in the UK started many years prior to this directive, we set the dummy variable for the UK to 1 from the year 1991 onwards. Second, the Czech Republic joined the EU only in 2004; thus we set REG for the Czech Republic to 1 from 2004 onwards. The self-constructed variable OU is coded as 1 if there is ownership unbundling of the transmission grid and 0 if there is no OU. 15 In order to capture additionally the country-specific degree of unbundling on the distribution lines, we use OVS, which is equal to 2 if the overall degree of vertical separation is unbundled, 1 if it is mixed, and 0 if it is integrated. IR is a self-created dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the case in which incentive regulation of the distribution lines has been introduced and 0 otherwise. The existence or non-existence of a liberalized wholesale market for electricity is coded as 1 = LWM and 0 = no LWM. TPA is 2 if there is regulated third-party access, 1 if thirdparty access is negotiated, and 0 if there is no third-party access. This measure is 15 An unbundling variable of the transmission grid is also available from the OECD Regulation Database, but this variable does not account for the important distinction between legal and ownership unbundling. no longer directly included in our regression analysis; instead, we make use of Nearing_TPA, which counts the years until negotiated or regulated TPA starts. 16 This variable is restricted to integer values between 0 and 5, implying that once TPA has been introduced, Nearing_TPA is set to 0. If the introduction of TPA will be in more than 5 years, Nearing_TPA is still set to the maximum value of 5.
For public ownership, we construct a self-created dummy variable, PO50, which takes a value of 1 in the case of majority state ownership, i.e., the public share in a firm is above 50%, and 0 otherwise. For a few years, it is rather difficult to identify clearly the exact share of public ownership, for instance because of cross-ownership patterns among utilities or because of mergers or ownership restructuring taking place in the middle of a year. In the robustness check section, a more continuous measure of public ownership is used to capture the ownership effect, since the degree of public ownership might have an influence on investment behavior. Therefore, we decide to employ another indicator, PO, which measures the general level of public ownership of electricity companies in a particular country. PO takes the value of 4 if the utilities are public, 3 if they are mostly public, 2 if they are mixed, 1 if they are mostly private, and 0 if they are private.
Beside regulatory and privatization measures, we also differentiate two other groups of potential determinants of utilities' R&D investment in the electricity sector. We control for firm-specific factors as well as for market-specific factors. The first firm-specific factor is firm size, as larger firms usually perform more R&D than smaller ones. The reason is that a given cost reduction caused by process innovation results in higher savings of a firm, when it is applied to a larger quantity. The second factor is the leverage ratio. On average, the leverage of the major European utilities increased after the mid-1990s (Bortolotti et al. 2011) . Permanently elevated leverage ratios lead to greater financial risk and to more constrained resources within a company, which might have negative consequences for (risky) R&D investment. Thirdly, we account for firm-specific shares in hydro and nuclear generation capacities. It is assumed that generators with a high share in hydro power generation have weaker incentives to conduct research, as this technology has not experienced big technological innovations during the last decades. In contrast, the amount of R&D spending on nuclear power technology has traditionally been high.
The first market-specific factor is the country-specific growth rate of electricity demand. This variable controls for demand shocks and acts as a demand shifter for R&D investment. The second factor is competition. We capture the level of competition with the C1 market concentration index and the wholesale market dummy, as has been pointed out previously. Moreover, public R&D support, such as tax incentives or direct R&D subsidies, can affect the amount and the composition of utilities' R&D spending (Hall and van Reenen 2000) . We capture those factors econometrically by firm and time fixed effects, to be explained in the next section.
Empirical Specification and Results
Econometric Modeling
For the selection of our estimation techniques, we had to consider two points that concern our data set and that, in addition, concern the nature of firm R&D spending. The first point deals with the observation that in reality all firms undertake capital investment, but not all firms perform R&D investment. The R&D decisions of firms can be described as a two-step process. First, the firm has to decide whether to conduct R&D or not. In the case that the answer is no, there is no second step; in the case that the answer is yes, the question arises of how much it wants to invest in R&D. Typically, these kinds of firm decisions are tackled econometrically as a censoring problem implying the application of a tobit model or as a sample-selection problem implying the application of a Heckman-type model (Cohen and Sanyal 2004; Sanyal and Cohen 2009 ). However, those two models do not apply to our data set, as we only consider utilities that have performed R&D in the past. 17 The second point reflects the situation that firms usually choose a rather stable level of R&D spending or of R&D intensity (R&D spending divided by sales), as " [t] he national wherewithal to carry out energy R&D cannot be turned on and off like a light switch when needed" (Dooley 1998, p. 554) . One main reason for this is the fact that the labor costs of the R&D department are relatively high and constant, as researchers are highly educated, difficult to find, and also need some time to derive utilizable results. For this reason, the usage of a static model specification seems to be superior to the usage of a dynamic one, as the lagged dependent variable would explain by far most of the current level of R&D spending, thereby upstaging the causal relations of the other variables. Finally, we employ a fixed-effects estimator for our panel data analysis, controlling for firm and time fixed effects.
We use the following model specification in order to analyze the impact of public ownership and regulation on the R&D spending of the utilities: where ln RD it is the log of firms' R&D expenditures, the subscript i denotes the firm, and t stands for the year. Firm fixed effects and year-specific effects are captured by ϕ i and η t , and ψ it is the error term assumed to be i.i.d. Firm factors, market factors, public ownership, and regulation are vectors that consist of the variables described earlier. Time lags of regulation and public ownership are used to mitigate endogeneity problems. In addition, we assume that changes in these variables need time to be reflected in the level of R&D investment. In order to deal with the research question raised in the introduction, we make use of different variables and strategies. First, we want to assess the overall impact of privatization and the regulatory reform process on R&D expenditures. Thus, PO50 and REG are the only privatization and regulatory variables included in our first-step analysis. However, regulation is a dynamic process that consists of many different measures, which can be modified independently of each other and which therefore should be considered independently of each other. In the second step, we make use of all the regulatory variables described previously in order to depict the whole regulatory process as comprehensively as possible. The main reason for the whole regulatory reform process has been the creation and establishment of effective competition on the electricity market. In an extension to the second step, we therefore incorporate a measure of market concentration into our analysis in order to assess the type of relation between competition and innovative investment.
Finally, it can become quite difficult to separate the different effects of privatization, regulation, and (nearing) competition on R&D investment and the whole innovative process; see Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) . The reason for this is that all these reforms have taken place during the same time period. However, we try to disentangle these potentially coincident relations by the use of a long time horizon and by the application of different model specifications, whereby we can further lag our main regulation and ownership variables. In addition, we explicitly tackle the problem of possible multicollinearity in the robustness section. Table 1 presents the findings of our first-step analysis. The results provide first evidence for hypothesis 4. Majority state ownership has a positive and highly significant influence on R&D spending. In other words, privatization might set negative incentives on the amount of R&D investment of European utilities, which is in line with Sterlacchini (2012) . 18 In contrast, the overall impact of regulation (according to the start of the European regulatory reform process) has a negative but insignificant sign. Therefore, we cannot confirm hypothesis 1, according to which the overall impact of the regulatory reform process on utilities' R&D spending is negative. Higher leverage and the share in hydro power generation have a negative effect on R&D expenditures. All the other variables are not significant.
Results
The missing significance of the overall regulation variable is the first indication that different regulatory measures could affect the R&D investment of utilities differently, which is confirmed by the results of our second-step analysis (see Table 2A and B), which offer a deeper and more comprehensive view of the subject. Different specifications are presented, which always include the ownership and regulatory variables, but differ in the control variables included. The reason for this is that some control variables are not available across the whole sample (unbalanced panel). In the first specification, we only include company Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
18 If we replace the firm-specific PO50 dummy variable with the more continuous but countryspecific PO measure, we also find a highly significant positive influence.
size as a control; in the second specification, we further account for demand shocks and the leverage ratio; in the third specification, we additionally control for the shares in hydro and nuclear generation. Finally, specifications (4), (5), and (6) only differ from the first three specifications due to the fact that they include the C1 market concentration index. In all the regressions, we employ the fixedeffects estimator. 19 Our main results are the following: First, a majority state ownership has a significant positive influence on R&D spending, which is true for all six specifications and in line with our hypothesis 4. This confirms our first-step analysis and is also consistent with most of the empirical evidence available for other industries; see for instance Munari et al. (2002) . At least two explanations exist for this. First, privatization is assumed to increase the efficiency of firms, which clearly also applies to the carrying out of R&D projects, due to fewer overheads and slack resources in the R&D department. Second, and potentially more importantly, private firms have much weaker incentives to perform particularly costly basic and long-term research (often with public goods characteristics) than public firms. 20 The reasons are different objective functions, as privatized firms are not welfare maximizers but profit maximizers. Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; all the specifications employ the two-way fixed-effects model.
20 Unfortunately, we only have data on the total amount of R&D investment of a utility and not separate data for basic and applied research. Therefore, we can only formulate this last point as a strong presumption.
Second, we cannot provide a clear answer to the question of how unbundling and ownership unbundling in particular influence R&D expenditures. While OU of the transmission grid has mostly an insignificant and positive sign in the different specifications, in one specification it is significant and negative; OVS, as a measure of the overall degree of unbundling (including both transmission grid and distribution lines), also takes on varying signs, which are never significant. Thus, possible negative effects of unbundling, such as reduced firm size, free riding, or the loss of coordination advantages, are counteracted by specialization advantages or reduced discrimination potential. In contrast to Gugler et al. (2013) , who find that ownership unbundling has a significantly negative impact on capital investment spending in the electricity sector, we cannot detect a clear impact on R&D spending. Third, we are not able to find a negative impact of incentive regulation on R&D investment, as IR is insignificant in all but one specification. The possible delaying and dampening effect of incentive regulation on R&D expenditures, caused by higher levels of uncertainty, cannot be confirmed by the empirical evidence. However, real-world incentive regulation regimes typically include cost pass-through components (in particular for certain R&D expenditures), which could neutralize the effects of incentive regulation on R&D investment and might explain our result here.
Fourth, market entry regulation is an important determinant of R&D spending. However, different components of entry regulation do not affect R&D in the same way. Confirming hypothesis 2, we find that the existence of a liberalized wholesale market attracts new investment in R&D, as LWM has a strong positive and highly significant sign in all the specifications. The introduction of a free wholesale market facilitates the creation of a more competitive electricity sector. Due to the nature of our data set, we primarily consider former incumbent utilities and can further conclude that incumbents invest more in R&D in order to "escape" from competition. In contrast, nearing third-party access to the transmission grid has a positive and significant impact on the R&D spending of the utilities in all but one specification, which is in line with hypothesis 3. In other words, the more years until the introduction of third-party access, the higher the investments in research. Anticipating liberalization, former incumbents seem to fear drastically changed market and regulatory framework conditions, and therefore nearing competition. This is associated with the pressure of cost-cutting, greater uncertainty, and additional risks, such that utilities are forced to reduce their R&D activities.
Fifth, the degree of market concentration (C1) has a negative and mostly significant sign in specifications (4), (5), and (6). This implies that a higher level of competition, which is equivalent to a lower degree of market concentration, has a positive impact on the R&D expenditures of European utilities. Since we primarily consider former incumbents, it can be assumed that more competitive pressure leads to the situation that the incumbent invests more in order to "escape" from the competition, which is in line with our results for the existence of a liberalized wholesale market.
Out of the firm-specific control variables, firm size has the expected highly significant positive sign in all the specifications, implying that bigger firms spend more on R&D than smaller ones. Demand growth has a negative sign, which in two specifications is significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the leverage ratio has a negative effect on R&D expenditures, even though it is significant only once. Higher leverage seems to prevent utilities from investing more in R&D due to more constrained financial resources. Firm-specific shares in generation technologies, such as hydro or nuclear power generation, also matter. While a higher share in hydro generation has a significant negative effect on research investment as this technology is relatively stable with regard to new innovations, a higher share in nuclear generation positively influences investment.
Robustness
In order to check the robustness of our results, we make use of further model specifications, which are presented in Table 3 .
First, to control for additional firm size effects, we replace our dependent variable with R&D intensity, all else being equal. All the main results hold up and log sales are no longer significant, as expected.
Second, in order to obtain a more continuous measure of public ownership, we replace the firm-specific public ownership dummy (PO50) with a variable measuring the general level of public ownership in a country (PO). Again, we find a positive sign of the public ownership measure, which is in line with hypothesis 4; however, the corresponding p-value is 0.11. Thus, our findings indicate that not only majority state ownership positively influences utilities R&D spending, but also the share of public ownership of utilities.
Third, we include a further lag of the public ownership and regulatory variables in our regressions to control for additional long-term effects. All the main results hold up, and some even increase in significance. However, the wholesale dummy (LWM) is only significantly positive with one time lag; the second lag instead is insignificant, which also leads to a positive, but insignificant, aggregated coefficient.
Finally, we might have multicollinearity problems, since the different regulatory measures may be highly correlated with each other due to the fact that the whole liberalization process has been taking place during the same period. Multicollinearity does not violate the OLS assumptions, but reduces the efficiency of the estimation, meaning that the standard errors are inflated. There is Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; all the specifications employ the two-way fixed-effects model.
no irrefutable test for detecting a high degree of multicollinearity, 21 but bivariate correlations that are too high may be an indication. Table 4 outlines the correlation matrix of our regulatory and privatization variables. All the correlation coefficients are below the critical values. However, the correlation coefficient between OVS and IR comes close to the conventional thresholds. In addition, the two unbundling variables OU and OVS show a rather high correlation, as one might expect. Therefore, we run additional regressions, in which we include the corresponding measures separately from each other. The results remain robust and the underlying tables are available upon request.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The R&D investment of major European utilities has dropped remarkably during the last two decades and is far away from its previous levels. At the same time, the need for new innovations in the energy and electricity sector remains continuously high, or even higher than ever. The reasons are, for example, the emission reduction goals or the need to develop more efficient and less fuel-dependent generation technologies. Still, the whole electricity industry is responsible for approximately one-fourth of the global greenhouse gas emissions (Stern 2008) . A report of the Advisory Group on Energy (2005) for the European Commission states that investment in energy R&D should be four times as high as its current level. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the possible reasons for this drop in utilities' R&D spending. In particular, we want to analyze whether the regulatory reform process or privatization contributed to this steep decline. The overall influence of the European regulatory reform process on R&D investment is ambiguous. The empirical evidence indicates that the approaching liberalization process, i.e., nearing competition, has a dampening effect on R&D spending. Utilities reduce their expenses due to increased uncertainties and additional risks. However, once the market and regulatory framework conditions have been set up and firms have become used to the new situation, higher levels of competition positively influence R&D and former incumbents invest more in order to "escape" from the competition. Moreover, we cannot find any indication that (ownership) unbundling and incentive regulation directly affect the research expenditures of the utilities. In contrast, the privatization of utilities seems to have strong negative consequences for their amount of R&D spending, pointing to a possible market failure in costly basic research with public goods characteristics.
In order to spur the R&D investment of utilities, policy makers and regulators have different possibilities, which may be used as complements. First, the currently rather low level of competition in the electricity sector might be further increased, for instance through the establishment of pro-competitive framework conditions. Second, the privatization of a utility should be accompanied by clear regulatory guidelines, which ensure that costly and welfare-enhancing basic and long-term research (often with public goods characteristics) will not be completely cancelled or replaced by short-term research activities that deliver more direct profits. An example of such guidelines comes from the British regulator Ofgem, which obliges distribution and transmission companies to spend a certain share of their utility revenues on innovation programs. Third, as the regulatory reform process changed the character and the lifetime of R&D activities -in the UK, for instance, the lifetime of R&D projects dropped from 5 to 7 years to < 3 years after the regulatory reforms and is expected to reach 1 year after full competition (Dooley 1998 ) -one could think about incentive programs of the government or other kinds of support schemes. More long-term research programs could further be promoted by public-private partnerships and more collaborative research projects, which may help to limit the risks for the investing parties. However, according to Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) , the establishment of support mechanisms that deliver the "right" incentives is not an easy task.
Nevertheless, there are many open questions concerning the interrelation between regulation and innovation in the electricity industry, indicating the need for more research on this topic. Our approach could be extended in several ways. First, one might use a more detailed data set if one is able to construct it. Thus, it would be desirable to incorporate R&D investment levels from (smaller) utilities, electrical equipment manufacturers, and public funds. Furthermore, it would be preferable to distinguish the different types of research projects (e.g. applied vs. basic research) and, lastly, to differentiate the stages of the electricity industry (generation, transmission, distribution) in which research is taking place. Finally, as this paper focuses on the input side of the innovation process, one could additionally analyze the impact of regulation on innovation outcomes. One may for example look at patent data (as, for example, Munari 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt 2011; Kucsera and Schmitt 2012) or one might use innovation measures that take into account both R&D inputs and R&D outputs (Burger and Weinmann 2012) . 
